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Abstract  When comparisons in terms of industrial policy lessons to be learned 
have taken place, it has tended to be solely vis-a-vis the „development state‟ East 
Asian experience. This paper broadens the analysis and considers lessons which 
African countries can learn from other so-called „tiger‟ economies including 
Ireland and the East and South Asian countries. We recognise that the latter are 
indeed clearly significant as many African countries at the time of independence 
had economic structures and levels of income quite similar to East Asian 
countries, yet have grown at vastly different rates since then. Exploring why this 
has been the case can thus offer important insights into possibilities for industrial 
policy. Yet this comes with some health warnings over East Asian experience. 
We suggest that another important contribution can come by looking at the Irish 
example, given its emphasis on corporatism rather than simply relying on state 
direction in the operation of industrial policy.  The Irish model is also more 
democratic in some senses and has protected workers‟ rights during the 
development process in contrast to the often highly dirigisite East Asian model.  
Overall we suggest that some immediate actions are needed, notably with regard 
to the financial system in small African economies.  Without such changes, a 
poorly functioning financial system will continue to keep investment at low levels.  
In relation to the small size of the African economies, the paper recommends 
regional integration and sufficient overseas development assistance (ODA) for 
infrastructural development. It is also critical to note that the various small African 
economies each face their own industrial and economic development challenges, 
and that a „one size fits all‟ approach is not appropriate; rather the key is to tailor 
policies and systems to the unique opportunities and development challenges in 
each African country. 
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1. Introduction 
African economies, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) stand at an 
important juncture. During the 1980s, for the average African country, GDP per 
capita actually fell at a rate of 0.5 percent per annum; in the 1990s it rose slightly 
at a rate of 0.3 percent per annum (see Table 1 below). However, in the last four 
years, the average growth rate has been a respectable 3 percent per annum. In 
2007, GDP growth rate in Africa was estimated to be 6 percent per annum, one 
of the highest rates recorded during any year over the last quarter century. Apart 
from indicating the recent recovery in African economic growth, the table also 
highlights the poor long term performance of the African economies relative to 
other developing countries. Over the entire 26 year period, 1981-2007, as seen 
in Table 1, per capita GDP in African countries rose only by 16 percent compared 
with more than a 100 percent rise for all developing countries. In contrast, for the 
East and South Asian economies, the growth in GDP per capita has been 
spectacular, a rise of well over 300 percent. 
 
Table 1: PER CAPITA GDP GROWTH BY REGION AND ECONOMIC 
GROUPING, 1981-2007 
 
(Per Cent) 
     Average annual  Overall 
     Growth   growth 
    _______________________    
______________________ 
    1981- 1990-   2003-   1981- 
    1989    2002     2007             2007 
 
World    1.4 1.2 2.3   41.4 
 
Developed economies 2.5 1.8 2.08   67.5 
 
Economies in transition 1.9 -4.0 7.3   -25.8 
 
Developing economies 1.7 3.0 5.0             112.5 
Of which: 
 
 Africa   -0.5 0.3 3.0   16.4 
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 America  -0.3 1.1 3.5   22.7 
 West Asia  -1.7 1.1 4.1   16.0 
 East and South Asia 5.1 5.3 6.3               317.5 
 
 
Source:  UNCTAD (2007A). 
 
It is a moot point whether this recent reversal of fortunes for the African countries 
has been due to the late success of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) of 
the World Bank and the IMF, as is claimed by the two Bretton Woods institutions 
(World Bank, 2007; IMF, 2008). These programmes, which have been the 
dominant influences on Sub Saharan African economies during much of 1980s 
and all of 1990s have embodied the Washington Consensus and its aftermath. 
According to independent economists [UNCTAD (2005), and (2007A), ILO 
(2007), Mickenley (2005), and Lall (2005)], although many countries 
implemented these programmes, there has not actually been much success in 
enhancing their economic growth on a sustained basis. Indeed Mkandawire 
(2005), a leading scholar of African economies, argues that the SAPs were 
essentially counterproductive and in fact often led to the wrong kind of structural 
change which hindered rather than helped economic development. 
 
Rather, the most plausible reason for the fast growth of African economies in the 
last four years would instead appear to be the huge increase in international 
commodity prices. Information provided by UNCTAD (2007A), as seen in table 2 
below, reveals how the prices of various commodities have changed over this 
period: 
 
Table 2: World PrimaryCommodity Prices, 2002-2006 (Percentage Change) 
Commodity group 2002-2006 
Food and Tropical Beverages 48.4 
Agricultural raw materials 62.3 
Minerals,ores and metals 219.9 
Crude petroleum 157.6 
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Source: UNCTAD Secretariat calculations, based on UNCTAD Commodity Price Bulletin, various 
issues, and UNSD, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, various issues.  Adapted from UNCTAD 
(2007A). 
 
The increased value of SSA exports as a result of the commodity price rise 
helped to relax the balance of payments constraint which in turn led to faster 
growth. Assuming continued favourable terms of trade, the central issue is 
whether or not the African countries can translate this recent improved 
performance into sustained, fast and long term economic growth.  Here, though, 
the economic history of these countries in the last half century does not provide 
much ground for optimism. The good record of African economic growth between 
1950 and 1973 when these economies expanded at a rate of nearly 5 percent 
per annum could not subsequently be sustained. Similarly, during the 1990s a 
number of countries were successively selected as the „African success stories‟ 
by the Bretton Woods institutions, none of which could actually maintain fast 
growth for more than 2-3 years (Mkwaindaire, 2005). Such economic history 
invites scepticism about the ability of African countries to convert their recent 
favourable changes in the terms of trade into lasting progress. The case of the 
sceptics is straightforward. Apart from all the other handicaps, the African 
countries have been further debilitated by two decades of stagnation or worse; 
and therefore seem unlikely to achieve fast long term growth. 
 
There are however important counter arguments which are equally an essential 
part of the story. The African countries are today much better equipped for 
initiating and sustaining fast growth, with a far greater endowment of human and 
material resources than they were 25 years ago.  
 The educational level of Africa‟s citizens is much higher today than it was 
in the early 1970s. This is particularly notable at the tertiary level. There 
were for example only 7 university graduates in Tanzania in 1964 at the 
time of the country‟s independence from British colonial rule. Today, after 
independence there are literally thousands, as a result of the 
establishment of the University of Dar-e-Salam, a splendid institution of 
higher education.  
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 There is a network of science and research institutions, engineering 
colleges, throughout the continent. A number of business schools have 
also been established and there is now close collaboration between the 
African and the best business schools in the US and the UK 
(Pfeffermann, 2008). 
 There are signs of an emerging middle class in African countries.  There 
is evidence also of the evolution of entrepreneurship in these countries 
(ibid.). 
 Moreover, as The Economist (2008) notes, “an unexpected and 
overlooked continent may benefit from its very isolation” (p.33).  It 
suggests by way of illustration that African banks are normally regarded 
as being very conservative and excessively regulated.  „Now, however‟ 
observes The Economist (2008), “this very de-linkage from the Western 
financial system has turned out to Africa‟s advantage.  Its banks have 
almost no exposure to the sub-prime market causing such havoc 
elsewhere.” 
 
With the above background, this paper considers the question of industrial policy 
for African countries and what lessons they can draw from the experience of 
other countries. As latecomers to industrialization, the African countries are well 
placed to carry out such an exercise.  Economic history of the last half century 
indicates that whereas industrial policy has been highly successful in some 
countries, it has been equally unsuccessful in others.  The African countries 
would wish to draw appropriate lessons from both sets of countries.  There is, 
however, a prior question which they obviously need to consider.  Should they 
have an industrial policy at all?  Here the experience of the East and South Asian 
countries does indicate that industrial policy has played a key role in the 
extraordinary success of these economies in recent decades.3  In addition to this 
there is another related and powerful reason for African countries to examine 
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closely the experience of Asian countries.  Many countries in the two regions at 
the time of independence from colonial rule had broadly similar economic 
structures and income. To illustrate, in the 1950s around the time of the country‟s 
independence, Malaysia‟s economy was much like that of Ghana, based on 
exports of primary agricultural commodities, rubber in case of Malaysia and 
cocoa in relation to Ghana. Both countries shared the common legacy of British 
colonial rule.  However, today, the Malaysian per capita income is nearly 5000 
USD at current exchange rates and 10,000 USD at PPP rates, while the Ghanian 
per capita income has risen very little over the same period. It is legitimate to ask 
how can one account for such difference in the evolution of the two economies? 
Was it, for example, simply due to the fact that the Ghanian economy was 
subject to greater economic shocks than Malaysia‟s? There is little empirical 
support for this hypothesis. Moreover, a large number of other East and South 
Asian countries also did very well using industrial policy and outperformed most 
African countries. For these reasons comparisons of African countries with East 
and South Asian countries are commonly made and and are useful. However in 
this paper we consider only briefly the experience of East Asian countries with 
industrial policy, but give detailed attention to Ireland as a comparator, and 
present the reasons for doing so.  
 
The next section briefly explains why Ireland is an interesting comparison for 
African countries and why lessons from the Irish experience will be useful. 
Section 3 to 8 then discuss in greater detail the role of industrial policy in a broad 
sense as well as other important factors in the development of the Irish economy, 
together with the lessons for African countries. Section 9 re-examines the case of 
East Asian countries as role models for economic development for African 
countries. Section 10 concludes.  Close attention to the Irish case does not of 
course imply that other countries‟ experiences are less important or less relevant, 
but we believe that Ireland‟s experience with industrial policy does have useful 
and significant implications for Africa.  Nevertheless, for African countries, at a 
practical policy level, we would like to endorse the caution from Professor Karl 
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Aiginger, one of the leading industrial policy economists in Europe.  Aiginger 
(2007) notes that „industrial policy is one of the most controversial policy fields…  
Its scope, instruments and rationale vary across countries, changing over time; 
intentions and outcomes often differ‟ (p. 143). 
 
2. Why is Ireland an Interesting Comparison for Africa? 
When Ireland joined the „Common Market‟ in 1973, the economy was in many 
senses a small, poor, peripheral and agriculturally dominated economy with an 
overdependence on links to its former colonial master, the UK. Trade was limited 
given ongoing protectionism (it is worth noting that the European Union (EU) in 
particular had yet to fully open up). Within three decades, however, the Irish 
economy has transformed itself from being one of the four cohesion countries of 
the EU to being considered an advanced high-tech enclave of the EU. 
 
There are also other reasons for using the Irish example: 
 Ireland, like most African countries is a small economy. It has the 
geographical size of Sierra Leone as well as a similar population. Given 
its small size, membership of the EU has played a major role in the 
evolution of the Irish success story. As well as providing a far larger 
market for Irish products so as to be able to reap the economies of 
scale, the EU has also provided Ireland with very large direct assistance 
for the development of its infrastructure. What could take the place of 
EU even in a limited sense in the present context of small African 
countries? This issue will be taken up below. 
 Although Ireland is far from being a laissez-faire economy it is by no 
means as „dirigiste‟ as the East and the South Asian countries. In 
particular, it has been more corporatist than the East Asian countries. 
The unions have played a major role in the determination of wages and 
prices. Compared with the East Asian model it is therefore more likely to 
be directly relevant to the African countries. The East and South Asian 
pattern of development is heavily dependant on the outstanding 
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qualities of the civil service.  These are not simply inherited or endowed 
but rather are developed alongside the expansion of the economy (see 
Chang, 2006). Nevertheless, the corporatist model makes 
comparatively less demands on administrative capacity. 
 It is arguable that the African countries would have more to learn from 
the experience of the operation of industrial policies in Ireland than in 
the East and South Asian countries. The Irish industrial policy did not 
involve measures of coercion in the allocation of resources in the way it 
did in the case of East Asian countries during the height of their 
industrial policy, for example, Japan between 1950 to 1973, and Korea 
between 1970 to 19904. It is worth recalling that during this period the 
Japanese government used the allocation of foreign exchange in 
coercive ways as a key weapon to meet government‟s targets for 
specific firms and industries (Brown, 1980). Similarly during Korea‟s 
main industrial policy period, there is evidence of coercion in the 
expansion and upgrading of country‟s exports by the Chaebol, the large 
conglomerates which the government itself had created (see Amsden 
(1989,1994), Amsden and Singh (1994), Singh (1995,1998), Chang 
(2006)). 
 It should not be forgotten that during the operation of industrial policy in 
a number of East Asian countries, industrial „peace‟ was ensured (or 
enforced) through the suppression of trade union rights. Some would 
argue that this alone makes the Irish example more suitable as a role 
model for African countries. 
 
The following sections examine in more detail the operation of industrial and 
developmental policies in Ireland and their relevance for African countries, before 
returning to some more positive „lessons‟ from East Asia.    
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3. SMEs in Ireland and in African Countries 
The similarities in economic experiences between the Irish case in the (not too 
distant) past and that of many small African states today warrants research to 
provide insights as to whether Ireland can regarded as a useful case study, 
especially around the development of small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs), especially given their importance in both Ireland and small African 
states. Of relevance here, some characteristics of Irish SMEs can be noted: 
(1) Irish SMEs were focussed primarily upon the home market. Indeed, 
export oriented SMEs were an uncommon occurrence in the Ireland of 
the 1970s.  
(2) Ireland‟s small manufacturing firms in the past were mostly found in 
„traditional‟ industries (such as food, beverages and tobacco, textiles and 
wood products). These industries were characterised by low productivity, 
skills and research and development (R&D).    
(3) Small firms in Ireland were then faced with similar barriers as small firms 
in Africa today (albeit on a different scale), namely: financial barriers 
(particularly at the start-up stage);
 
and poor macroeconomic conditions, 
as well as a poor business environment.5   
 
Until recently, there has also been no well–defined, structured or focussed  
policy for support of SMEs in Ireland. As we shall see below, industrial policy in 
Ireland has mostly been geared towards FDI and it could reasonably be argued 
that this has been at the expense of indigenous companies.  This has some 
similarities to Africa, where an adverse business environment (with little support 
from government agencies, the regulatory offices and the managers of state 
enterprises) is an additional impediment for small firms.   
                                       
5
 On the latter point, numerous studies on the barriers encountered by small firms in Ireland have 
pointed to access to finance as being the single most critical issue (Forfás 1994; Goodbody 
Economic Consultants 2002; Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2001).  Very recent work on the 
Irish case shows that small businesses continue to experience difficulties in obtaining appropriate 
levels of finance for start-up and growth (Small Business Forum, 2006).  This finding has been 
reiterated in recent work with regard to small firms in Africa.  
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Despite these apparent similarities, one key aspect missing in the African case is 
the benefit of European integration in the form of the single market. When Ireland 
joined the then „Common Market‟, there was a lack of developed common 
policies outside of the already well-developed the Common Agricultural Policy 
(which at the time absorbed three quarters of the EC budget). Over time, though, 
there have been two ways in which EU economic integration has brought 
substantial opportunities for small firms: (i) through reciprocal recognition of 
standards in the Single Market through the Acquis Communautaire and (ii) 
through the benefits emanating from structural funding, particularly in the sphere 
of infrastructural development. The latter has brought significant benefits to 
Ireland.  Beyond the costs associated with the Acquis, it can generate many 
advantages to small firms in the medium to long run, as they will be able to 
benefit from the Single Market. This, combined with deregulation in the EU also 
assists cross border trade by small firms engaging in flexible specialisation. 
Finally, the Single Market is also helpful in attracting market-seeking FDI, an 
element which is very much missing from the African case. 
 
From its post World War II beginnings in the European coal and steel community, 
the EU has evolved into an integrated single market in the region of  450 million 
people. At the time of writing, fifteen member states have also adopted a 
common currency and a common monetary policy together with many other 
measures of deep political integration. Such far reaching integration is well 
beyond the capacities of SSA countries. However, there are substantial benefits, 
economic as well as political, even from the limited regional integration which 
some countries have attempted. There are also a few reasonably well functioning 
examples of integration in African countries, notably in Southern Africa. The 
emphasis in the more successful of these late integration projects has been less 
on trade integration but more on integration of transport as well as in other 
spheres of infrastructure. Over time these countries could potentially cooperate 
on monetary matters as well as on trade and investment. The possibilities of 
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African economies to be able to benefit from the kind of assistance which Ireland 
received from the EU may not appear to be a practical proposition for African 
countries, however.  Yet it may not be entirely fanciful, either.  Who is to say that 
to acknowledge the contribution of Afro-Americans to building up modern United 
States, let alone to right the historic wrongs, a possible President Obama may 
not launch the equivalent of a Marshall Plan for African countries?  Such a plan 
should encourage regional integration on the E.U. pattern, leading ultimately to 
deep integration.  Even if such a grand vision does not materialise, the essential 
point is that ODA to African countries should be used to encourage regional 
integration to create a larger market for firms in participating countries as well as 
to provide funding for the development of regional infrastructure.  
 
4. Viewing Development in the Round: The need for a Holistic Approach to 
Policy 
Commonly adopted definitions of industrial policy are too narrow where the key 
focus, particularly in the past, has been on grant-aiding firms and intervention 
with respect to particular sectors, even with a more recent focus on policies 
focused directly at the promotion of R&D and innovation and/or FDI and SMEs.  
In general terms throughout Europe there has been a swing from „capacity‟  
building, with a focus on subsidies for capital and employment towards 
„capability‟  building, with a focus on R&D and training interventions by 
policymakers .  We argue that good practice industrial policy is in fact much more 
„holistic‟ than the above and focuses simultaneously on both demand and supply 
side factors of industrial development; on micro economics, meso economics and  
macro economics.6   Such an approach is broadly in line with that suggested by 
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 Singh (1995) comments on the inter-relationship between industrial policy and macro economic 
stability with particular reference to the experience of East Asian countries.  To the extent that 
industrial policy was effective in Japan or the Republic of Korea in relieving the balance-of-
payments constraint, it will also have aided macroeconomic stability.  A current account balance 
at the desired growth rate can help to avoid the stop-go cycles which many economies 
experience.  This, in turn, will lower the cost of capital since for a given savings rate in the 
economy, other things being equal, the more variable and unstable the economic performance, 
the higher the interest rate.  Similarly, faster economic growth also leads to faster growth of real 
wages, and hence enhances social stability and the political legitimacy of the socio-economic 
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the „Culliton Report‟ (1992) in the context of Irish industrial policy. Culliton (1992) 
emphasised provision of infrastructural needs; reform of the tax system; a re-
focusing of the education and training system; increased funding for science and 
technology (coupled with greater involvement by industry in steering the use of 
these funds); and a greater emphasis on technology acquisition. In so doing, the 
report stressed keeping the role of the industrial promotion agencies under 
review, as well as the desirability of fostering clusters of related industries 
building on „leverage points‟ of national advantage was also highlighted.  
As for indigenous industry, Culliton saw the widespread existence of grants as 
being often counterproductive (the argument being that it encourages a hand-out 
mentality). In this vein, more emphasis should be placed on: the increased use of 
equity finance as opposed to non-repayable cash grants; an emphasis on the 
need for the expansion of the indigenous sector; a reorganisation of grant 
awarding agencies into two main agencies, one of which would address the 
needs of foreign-owned industries, the other the needs of indigenous ones.  
Culliton was also at pains to stress that the Irish Department of Industry and 
Commerce was overly focused on operational matters and needed to place 
industrial policy formulation and evaluation at the centre of its activities.  We 
argue that a „good practice‟ definition of industrial policy includes all of these but 
also needs to emphasise other factors such as well functioning labour and credit 
markets, an appropriate macro-environment, and attempts to build consensus 
over appropriate policy direction.   
 
We broadly agree with Hitchens and Birnie (1992) in their commentary on 
evaluating the Culliton report that the real challenge is to try to weigh the 
importance of the above factors with regard to the overall „competitiveness 
problem‟ (we would however be more inclined to see this as the industrial or 
economic development challenge).  With reference to improving competitiveness 
(or in our case industrial or economic development) the authors correctly point 
                                                                                                                  
order.  Thus, macroeconomic stabilization and industrial policy interact with each other in a 
virtuous circle of cumulative causation. 
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out that there is little point calling for the need to improve competitiveness  
“…without any satisfactory definition that can be operationalised” (p. 29).  They 
proceed to argue that “this lack of identification of its causes and hence effective 
solutions is an impediment to a satisfactory industrial development policy” (ibid).  
Therein of course lays the challenge for policymakers regardless of country.   
 
Thinking back to Ireland‟s less favourable times, the preface to the Culliton report 
(1992) opens its narrative with the following comment: “over the past six months 
we have considered industrial policy bearing in mind the 260,000 people who are 
unemployed. We have concluded that there are no short term solutions, no quick 
fixes and no soft options left” (p. 7). In addition, it notes; “Ireland‟s economic 
problems are deep-rooted and persistent. Their resolution will require patience, 
determination and a fundamental re-appraisal of our strengths and weaknesses” 
(p. 7). 
 
A more „holistic‟ view of industrial policy also recognizes that organizations 
operate within a system whereby many factors and policies from a plethora of 
other areas impact on the success or otherwise of these organizations.  An 
example of the latter can be seen when we look at the case of innovation policy.  
Any analysis by policymakers or researchers needs to take account that 
organizations are not innovating in isolation but in the context of a system7.  We 
would argue that Aiginger (2007) in his special issue on the future of industrial 
policy follows a similar line to the „holistic‟ definition of industrial policy put 
forward in the current paper when he outlines that “The upcoming new approach 
to industrial policy all hints at a more systemic industrial policy, forward looking 
and emphasizing the synergies with other policy areas, but also fine-tuning to 
specific needs, comparative advantages and future technologies” (p. 143).   
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In line with this broad and holistic view of what industrial policy should 
encompass, in the Irish case we can identify a range of factors which played a 
significant part in Ireland‟s recent „catch up‟.  These comprise: 
(1) Currency devaluations in both 1986 and 1993. These were locked into the 
single currency, with the Euro‟s post-2000 depreciation in turn benefiting 
outward orientated states such as Ireland (of course, this has more 
recently been reversed);  
(2) A series of corporatist social pacts from 1987 where trade unions limited 
wage increases in return for income tax cuts. These have allowed rapid 
growth without inflation rising excessively and have also enabled rapid 
employment growth; 
(3) A rapid expansion in labour supply, in part through net in-migration.8 More 
widely, the demographic shifts Ireland has experienced are unique within 
the EU, with an even balance between natural growth and migration (Salt 
2005: 49)9;  
(4) An interventionist industrial policy targeted certain sectors for FDI 
(industrialization by invitation) yet also recognised the limitations of FDI-
based growth and somewhat belatedly sought to better link foreign plants 
with domestic firms and tried to develop indigenous capabilities and 
improvements in entrepreneurship, labour skills and research and 
development.  
This analysis has implications for the design of industrial and other policies in 
other small, open and peripheral economies. We suggest that whilst important 
lessons may be learned, they may not be those picked up by mainstream 
commentators such as Sapir et al (2003).  Furthermore, it should be noted that a 
range of factors came together: some more by luck than by judgement, and that 
                                       
8 Ireland has the highest fertility rate in the EU, and between 1981 and 2001 experienced a 
population increase of 15 per cent, from 3.5 million to just over 4 million in 2004 (NESC 2005: 1).   
9
 UNCTAD (2007; 25) notes that monetary or non-monetary resource transfers by migrants to 
their home countries are increasingly recognized as an important source of financing for 
development in Africa, being the second largest source of development capital flows to 
developing countries.  
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the Irish catch-up should have happened much earlier had it not been for 
previous policy mistakes, particularly at the macro-level (Bailey et al, 2007). 
Indeed, on the macroeconomic-side, stabilisation was an important part of finally 
„getting things right‟ in Ireland. By the mid-1980s, the fiscal deficit in Ireland had 
grown to over 12% of GDP and the public debt ratio was approaching 120%.  
The recognition of the need to address these imbalances led to both the social 
pacts after 1986 and a process of fiscal consolidation achieved by the 
government reducing expenditure; over the two year period 1988-1989, the ratio 
of expenditure to GDP was reduced by 9% (see Bailey et al, 2007). The pain of 
this adjustment was eased both by EU funding and an improved external 
environment with reduced interest rates and improving demand (Lynch, 2005).10 
Of key relevance, the impact of EU structural funding assistance starting in 1988 
should not be underestimated: one study suggests that the cumulative effects of 
funding may have been to raise the level of GDP by over 4 per cent (Schweiger 
and Wickham, 2005: 50). Another suggests at least approximately 0.5 of a 
percentage point to GNP growth during the 1990s (Barry et al, 2001: 549). In 
other words, external funding gave Ireland enough space to stabilise its macro 
economy and to undertake investment (especially in infrastructure) designed to 
enhance competitiveness; this may be relevant for African economies in the 
context of overseas development assistance.  Similarly, in the Africa case, 
UNCTAD (2005; 34) notes that overseas development assistance (ODA) could 
trigger such a “growth process if it is focused on financing pro-growth public 
investment such as economic infrastructure”. 
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In addition, in the Irish case, currency depreciations which took place in 1986 and 
1993 assisted Irish competitiveness; the latter in particular was a 10% 
depreciation which was then locked into Euro entry. Whilst there was a 
revaluation of the Punt before Euro entry in 1998, the depreciation of the Euro 
after its launch delivered a further 20% boost to Irish competitiveness given its 
external-orientation in trade towards non-Euro zone economies. That this did not 
feed through into higher inflation is in part due to a number of corporatist social 
pacts which built consensus.  
Such corporatism has been a long-standing central feature of Irish economic 
policy, with the establishment of the National Economic and Social Council 
(NESC) in 1973. As noted, by the early 1980s, Ireland faced a „crisis‟ as the 
government had embarked on deficit-financed expenditure programmes after the 
oil price rise of the early 1980s (and indeed the early 1970s). The existing 
development strategy based on attracting FDI was also criticised for its failure to 
support domestic industry (Telesis, 1982; Culliton, 1992).  Trans-nationals 
responded to the crisis by cutting investment and repatriating profits, contributing 
to a deficit on the balance of payments amounting to around 10% of GNP. 
Meanwhile, unemployment rose to around 20% of the labour force.  
At this crisis point, the major political parties recognised that an expansionary 
fiscal policy was no longer an option for Ireland as a small open economy. A 
social consensus for change emerged.  Key to this was the proposal by the trade 
unions in 1984 for a coordinated approach involving income policies, or 
„partnership agreements‟. Indeed, Kennedy (2001: 135) argued that without 
partnership agreements, it is unlikely that unions would have tolerated a rise in 
the profit share of national income (see below). Developing a shared view of 
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what needs to be done certainly seems to have been a key element in enabling 
the Irish catch-up.11   
Between 1988 and 2005 there were six social partnership agreements between 
government, unions and employers. The original programme was the 
Programme for National Recovery (PNR) which ran from 1987 to 1990. The PNR 
set out a strategy to raise competitiveness with four main components, which 
were developed over time in subsequent partnership agreements, with later 
agreements having broader coverage (including chapters on greater social 
inclusion, equality, enterprise culture, small business, agriculture, public service 
modernisation and a commitment to support partnership at the enterprise level): 
 Reducing the level of public debt and maintaining the internal and external 
stability of the Irish currency. This has focused on creating low inflation 
and interest rates and a positive climate for investors. From the mid 1990s 
onwards this has tied into the EU‟s Maastricht Criteria and Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). 
 Restraining wage rises in order to improve cost competitiveness. An 
incomes policy became an essential part of the „new development 
strategy‟. In return, the government compensated for wage restraint by 
lowering income taxes, although recently this has perhaps reached the 
limits of what is achievable. 
 To enhance competitiveness, pacts have included structural reforms in 
several areas such as industrial policy and taxation. The latter was seen 
as needing reform to encourage employment creation, being seen as 
biased towards capital and property. 
 Social justice has been seen as important and there have been 
improvements in welfare payments for the least well-off. 
The Irish experience, then, suggests the importance of strong institutional 
                                       
11
 MITI (the Ministry of International Trade and Industry) in Japan may have played a similar 
consensus-building role after the Second World War through to the 1980s (see Bailey and 
Sugden, 2007). 
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arrangements in fostering social cohesion around development objectives.  In 
addition to this, as Andreosso-O‟Callaghan and Lenihan (2006) detail, a range of 
other factors came together to enable Ireland to catch up with other European 
economies, including: 
 Progression towards a modern telecommunications network; this was 
significantly helped by the decrease in telecommunications costs which 
subsequently reduced the real costs associated with firm location in a 
peripheral economy such as Ireland.  
 Human capital accumulation: In contrast to other peripheral host countries 
for foreign investment, Ireland had a relatively skilled (and English 
speaking) labour force. Yet it is worth noting that rapid economic growth in 
Ireland has taken place without much investment in innovation. By EU and 
international standards, and in spite of its relative current wealth, Ireland 
still suffers from a low R&D to GDP ratio (and/or R&D/GNP ratio). In 
contrast with one of the key lessons advocated by mainstream 
commentators, modern economic growth in Ireland does not owe much to 
innovation.  
 Competition policy and deregulation: The introduction of competition policy 
and deregulation in the early 1990s was important in terms of delivering 
on cost competitiveness for firms using Ireland as an export platform (see 
Braunerhjelm et al., 2000).  
 A shift in the type of products being traded internationally: Geographical 
disadvantage may not count as heavily anymore. As Krugman outlined: 
“…changes in both the nature of what nations trade and in how they carry 
out that trade has shifted the balance of geographical advantage in a way 
that is favourable to Ireland” (Krugman 1997; 44).  
 
In referring to this well-rehearsed debate regarding Irish growth, we simply wish 
to stress that there were many factors which contributed to the success of the 
Irish economy particularly from the mid 1990s onwards, and the industrial policy 
approach adopted by the Irish government was only one feature in the myriad of 
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factors which contributed to the Irish success story. Yet we would still suggest 
(see below) that there may be potential for government intervention in the SME 
sector in small economies such as those in sub-Saharan Africa to lead to 
significant improvements in the key growth indicators of these countries.  
5. Using Foreign Direct Investment Intelligently 
It is widely recognised that foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to Africa, 
although increasing, are “still too limited in geographical coverage and focused 
on extractive industries to have a significant effect on employment creation and 
poverty alleviation” (UNCTAD, 2007; 1).  A key cause of this is the high degree of 
risk and poor business environment, which deters FDI. According to UNCTAD 
(2007; 46), these impediments include “(a) poor infrastructure, (b) high entry 
costs, (c) labour market constraints, (d) low investor protection, and (e) high 
taxes and a cumbersome tax system”.  On the tax front, UNCTAD (ibid) notes 
that a typical firm in sub-Saharan Africa pays the equivalent of 71% of its profits 
in taxes, some 15% percent higher than the second-highest rate, paid in Europe 
and Central Asia.   
 
In sharp contrast, FDI, notably from the United States, has been a major trigger 
for economic growth in Ireland.  Indeed, relative to the size of the economy, 
Ireland has one of the highest levels of FDI inflows in the world. Whilst 
successive Irish governments have welcomed FDI since the 1950s, from the 
early 1970s onwards the government approach shifted towards a greater 
emphasis on selectivity and careful targeting, with pharmaceutical and 
electronics especially targeted. These industries were ideal for peripheral 
locations in that they were characterised by relatively low transportation costs 
and high growth rates (Braunerhjelm et al, 2000).  Furthermore, the US was 
targeted as the most probable market for such projects given the likely benefits 
that would accrue to US firms using Ireland as an export base within the EU.  
The promotion and assistance of particular sectors was well timed. For example, 
the extension by the Irish government of financial incentives to internationally 
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traded services just as they were about to grow in importance was a particularly 
timely intervention. Later, during the 1990s, industrial clusters in such sectors 
began to develop which involved linkages, spillovers and sub–supply 
relationships with SMEs (see below). There was also a demonstration effect in 
operation, whereby the positive experiences of foreign investors in Ireland 
stimulated further FDI.  If such strategic targeting and a more focused approach 
to FDI was a key part of the contribution of FDI to Irish development, this raises 
the question as to what sectors should small African countries now be targeting? 
Whilst the high levels of FDI were largely brought about by a corporate–friendly 
environment offering the lowest corporate tax rate in the EU, it should be noted 
that these tax breaks had existed for decades with limited impact on economic 
success. Moreover, other European economies have had such rates without 
attracting such levels of US FDI – in part this may be because of the cultural links 
between Ireland and the US where many US citizens can trace their ancestry 
back to Ireland, a factor which cannot be replicated or seen as a „lesson‟ for 
others.  Similarly, House and McGrath (2004) note that the emphasis on 
education and training and a favourable corporate tax environment were both 
already in place before the mid-1980s when the economy was still stagnating 
(ibid.).  Of particular note was the recognition by the Irish government in the late 
1970s and early 1980s that foreign transnationals were in effect branch plant 
operations and that the policy of heavily subsidising FDI was producing little in 
the way of wider spillovers for the economy. Because of this, policy began to 
adopt a more selective approach to FDI, focusing more on high-tech and higher 
value added firms. Transnational firms‟ motivations for FDI in Ireland also shifted 
at this time, towards accessing the single market and access to skilled labour.   
It should be noted that problems and challenges remain and that the picture of 
FDI-induced „transformation‟ is challenged by some.  A key „lesson‟, as we shall 
see below in more detail, would actually be that spillovers from FDI are not 
generated automatically and that an industrial policy that targets and positions 
FDI is vital to ensure wider spillovers and to benefit the domestic sector.  The 
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case is not anti-FDI per se; rather, we recognise the value of high-quality FDI in 
assisting economic development. Rather, it needs to be stressed that this should 
not come at the expense of ignoring domestic firms.  In a related vein, Buckley et 
al (2006) argue that the contribution of transnationals to the Irish economy can 
also be overestimated by failing to take account of the following: the high level of 
imports (including payments for patents, royalties and other tangible inputs) and 
repatriated profits.  Citing the work of Keating (2000), the authors show that 
“…sales amounted to €72 billion in 2004.  However, when imports of €43 billion 
and profit repatriation of €19 billion are deducted the direct contribution to GNP is 
only 10 billion” (Buckley et al 2006: 2).  
Attracting high-quality FDI and positioning it seems crucial. Here, lessons with 
FDI experiences in peripheral regions of the EU seems highly relevant in taking 
on board elements of „good practice‟. This includes targeting strategic sectors 
and linking FDI to cluster development, building trust with local managers in 
order to try to upgrade local plants, undertaking sector specific research on the 
strengths and weaknesses of local industry, providing aftercare support, targeting 
financial assistance at specific upgrading needs (e.g. investment in R&D rather 
than general support), and the monitoring of performance (see Amin and 
Tomaney, 1995; Bailey et al 1999).  The Irish experience of selectively targeting 
FDI seems very relevant here and raises the issue more generally of using 
selective as well as horizontal industrial policy.12   
 
The discussion of this section will be seriously incomplete without reference to 
the fact that in the practice of industrial policy in East Asia, both Japan and South 
Korea discouraged FDI rather than to seek it.  Singh (1995) noted that among 
developing countries, the Republic of Korea was second only to India in its low 
reliance on FDI inflows.  Foreign capital stocks totaled just 2.3 per cent of GNP in 
                                       
12
 See Bailey and Cowling (2007) who note that industrial policy in the US and Japan has 
involved both vertical measures in targeting new technologies and emerging industries, and 
horizontal measures to support all industries, suggesting that the current focus in Britain and the 
EU with the horizontal aspects of industrial policy has been largely misplaced. 
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1987 for the Republic of Korea, above the 0.5 per cent estimate for India, but far 
below the levels of 5.3 per cent for Taiwan Province of China, 17 per cent for 
Hong Kong, a massive 87 per cent for Singapore, 10 per cent for Brazil and 14 
per cent for Mexico (UN, 1993).  In the view of the World Bank economists, this 
discouragement was a self-imposed handicap, which was compensated for by 
the fact that both countries remained open to foreign technology through 
licensing and other means (East Asian Miracle, p.21).  Singh noted that World 
Bank economists did not ask the question: if the governments of Japan and the 
Republic of Korea were as efficient and flexible in their economic policy as they 
themselves suggested (to account for their long-term, overall economic success), 
why did they persist with this apparently wrong-headed approach for so long? 
Indeed it was not until the 1990s that Japan really finally opened up for inward 
FDI (Bailey, 2003). 
 
Perhaps the approach was not so wrong-headed after all?  It was “functional” 
within the context of the overall industrial policies which the two countries were 
pursuing.  First, it would have been difficult for MITI or the authorities of the 
Republic of Korea to use “administrative guidance” to the same degree with 
foreign firms as they were able to do with domestic ones.  Secondly, as UN 
(1993) rightly emphasized, there was a link between the national ownership of 
large firms and their levels of investment in research and development.  The 
Republic of Korea had, in relative terms, by far the largest expenditure on R&D 
among developing countries: 1.9 per cent of GNP in 1988, compared with 1.2 per 
cent for Taiwan Province of China (1988), 0.9 per cent for India (1986) and 
Singapore (1987), 0.5 per cent for Argentine (1988), 0.6 per cent for Mexico 
(1984) and 0.4 per cent for Brazil (1985).  Korea‟s performance in this area 
outstripped that of many developed countries- for example Belgium (1.7 per cent 
in 1987), Denmark (1.5 per cent in 1987) and Italy (1.2 per cent in 1987).  It was, 
of course, still below that of industrial super-powers, Japan (2.8 per cent in 1987) 
and Germany (also 2.8 per cent in 1987).  Thirdly, Freeman (1989) stressed 
another important advantage of the policy of mainly rejecting foreign investment 
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as a means of technology transfer.  This, he argued, automatically placed on the 
enterprise the full responsibility for assimilating imported technology.  This was 
far more likely to lead to total system improvements and broader spill-overs than 
the “turn-key plant” mode of import or the foreign subsidiary mode.   
 
It is important to emphasize that Japan and South Korea‟s rejection of FDI did 
not mean that these countries are not interested in importing foreign technology.  
Quite the contrary.  Japan after all has been attempting to obtain technology from 
abroad for a hundred years, with an emphasis on licensing, joint ventures and 
foreign involvement rather than FDI.  The reason why it did not favour FDI as a 
source of technology was that it was inter alia comparatively much more 
expensive than licensing. The latter was a policy pursued by Japan up to the 
1980s, when under pressure from the US it began finally to dismantle such 
barriers and started to allow in FDI without requiring a Japanese joint venture 
partner (Bailey and Sugden, 2007).  Such considerations may also be valid for at 
least some SSA countries who may also prefer to import technology through 
licensing rather than through the medium of FDI. 
 
6. Fostering Domestic Enterprise 
Authors such as Bailey et al (2007), have argued that the Irish government, on 
recognising the limitations of solely focusing on FDI as an engine of growth, also 
sought to develop indigenous small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and 
entrepreneurship more generally. Whilst recognizing this argument, we stress 
that this focus on indigenous SMEs and entrepreneurship by Irish policymakers 
should have come much earlier.  Despite the fact, as outlined by Andreosso-
O‟Callaghan and Lenihan (2006: 282), that “…even as far back as 1979, some 
95 per cent of all manufacturing units could be classified as SMEs”, it is 
nevertheless remarkable that there was no formal focus by the Irish government 
on the small firms sector per se until 1994 with the publication of „The Task Force 
on Small Business Report‟ (1994).  
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One can convincingly argue that the Irish government to a large degree 
overlooked the indigenous (largely SME sector) until the mid 1990s. As such, this 
represents a key policy „failure‟ and should be avoided by small African states.   
Admittedly, in the Irish case there were grants available to indigenous firms to 
start-up and expand - but the focus on indigenous and SME firms was over-
shadowed by the prime focus by the Irish government on FDI. This is evident in 
comments from various reviews of industrial policy over the decades; most 
notably the „Telesis Group‟ (1980), which highlighted an over-emphasis on 
foreign industry.  The Culliton report also emphasised the need to expand the 
indigenous sector.  However, it was not until the „Task Force on Small Business 
Report‟ published in 1994 that the focus on the SME sector by Irish policy 
makers truly began in earnest.   
Some of the challenges facing small firms in Ireland are similar, albeit in a much 
more intense form, in Africa, most notably the issue of access to finance. As 
UNCTAD (2007) notes, this is especially the case for the small domestic 
enterprises in the informal sector that represent the vast majority of firms. Indeed, 
it is thought that firms in sub-Saharan Africa fund between one half and three 
quarters of their new investments from their own informal savings. In order to 
address this, microfinance systems have emerged in recent years in order to 
address some of the shortcomings of the financial system in Africa. 
 
More generally, Acs et al (2007) suggest that entrepreneurs in Ireland are held in 
high esteem, and that this has been beneficial for the economy. This is 
questionable, however, and Culliton (1992) highlighted “…the negative attitude 
towards enterprise that is prevalent in this country” (p. 22), with a “…a deep-
rooted prejudice against failure in business.  The stigma that attached to a failed 
enterprise very often inhibits the individual from ever trying again” (p. 22).  
Perhaps it could be argued that such a negative attitude no longer exists.  
However, ten years later from Culliton, Goodbody Economic Consultants (2002), 
although acknowledging an improvement, still noted that the “non-acceptance of 
„failure‟, both on the part of financial institutions and the general public is still 
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perceived to be an issue by Irish entrepreneurs” (p. iv).  They do however, admit 
that “these attitudes are somewhat at variance with recent international studies 
which indicate that the general public‟s attitude towards entrepreneurship in 
Ireland is now highly favourable” (p. iv).   
 
7. Embedding Growth through Spillovers, Linkages and Clusters 
There was an expectation and hope in Irish industrial policy circles that 
indigenous SMEs would „… grow from foreign firms through linkages and 
spillovers‟ (Andreosso-O‟Callaghan and Lenihan, 2006: 280).  This spillover 
argument is often used by governments to justify subsidies for FDI, but it is well 
known that such spillovers are not guaranteed. It is to this issue that we now turn, 
asking how successful (where they existed) were Irish Government policy 
interventions in achieving successful linkages and spillovers between incoming 
transnationals and indigenous (largely SME) firms?  This is significant as some 
authors see this link as a key element of the Irish „success story‟. For example, 
Pike et al (2006; 233) suggest that: 
„the role of industrial policy… seems important, with the Irish state and its 
governance institutions proving adept at providing the kinds of territorial assets 
that attract the sorts of TNCs that will contribute to development. Ireland may 
provide an example of a somewhat „strategic coupling‟ between domestic and 
foreign owned firms…‟. 
 
The FDI literature tells us that, if present, positive spillovers from transnationals 
can lead to increases in the productivity of domestic firms.  This can happen via 
three main routes: (1) demonstration effects; (2) competition effects, and; (3) 
labour market effects.  As noted, spillovers are not generated automatically but 
are in essence driven by the characteristics of the host economy, such as its 
degree of economic development, its ability to assimilate imported technology 
and more generally its absorptive capacity (see Blomström and Kokko, 1996 and 
Blomström et al. 2000).  In this section we briefly highlight the key evidence 
regarding the prevalence of such linkages and spillovers in Ireland.  Most 
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notably, despite the rhetoric of „FDI-led adjustment‟, there is significant evidence 
to suggest that the Irish economy operates according to a Lewis-type dualism 
“…with little relationship / interdependence between MNEs and (local 
enterprises) and each developing according to its own pattern” (Ugur and Ruane, 
2004: 3). As such, each sector appears to have developed according to its own 
pattern. Such problems of „dualism‟ remain a major problem in many developing 
economies; for example UNCTAD (2007;6) notes that in Africa, FDI is 
“…relatively volatile and tends to focus on extractive industries with very few 
linkages to the domestic economy”.   
 
In the Irish case, there is evidence from some sectors at least of improved 
linkages over time, such as in electronics (see Görg and Ruane, 2000; 2001), 
even if foreign (particularly large) firms have lower linkages – perhaps due to the 
necessary scale needed to supply such firms (ibid.). Other authors (e.g., Kearns 
and Ruane, 2001) suggest that the level of R&D activity in a plant is a key 
determinant with regards to lengthening the duration over which that plant will 
stay in Ireland, and also with respect to improving the quality of the employment 
generated in the plant. For high-technology sectors, the evidence of spillover 
effects is even more evident (Görg and Strobl, 2002; 2003; Barry and Van 
Egeraat, 2008). Here, there is evidence to suggest that the presence of 
transnationals in high-technology sectors has had a “life-enhancing” effect on 
indigenous plants in Ireland, improved indigenous entry rates, and has improved 
links between manufacturers and components suppliers in sectors such as IT. 
 
Other contributions (by Heanue and Jacobson, 2003; Forfás  2004; Lenihan and 
Sugden, 2008) have explored the issue of linkages in Ireland. Lenihan and 
Sugden (2008) argue that the National Linkages Programme introduced in 1985 
was partly in response to criticism of an industrial policy approach by Irish 
government that relied on transnationals and was subsequently restructured by 
Enterprise Ireland with a focus surrounding the issue of the globalization of local 
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supply industry.  This approach resulted in a move towards the building of supply 
networks and chains as opposed to actual direct local company linkages. Forfás 
(2004) in analyzing the impact of the National Linkages Programme argued that it 
stopped short of reaching its potential, while Heanue and Jacobson (2003) 
argued that there was some success up to the 1990s but thereafter the impact 
was insignificant.  In terms of more traditional sectors, Culliton (1992: 31) argued 
that only a small proportion of potential linkages between foreign and traditional 
firms were being realized; and that “[i]n general,…. policy to promote industrial 
linkages has not lived up to its expectations. It is only a mild exaggeration to say 
that most of the newer foreign firms operate here as essentially an industrial 
enclave” (ibid.). The overall conclusion on the success or otherwise of linkages in 
Ireland is succinctly summed up by Ruane (2001) when she concludes that “…it 
is hard to either totally prove or disprove…” (p. 12) whether linkage policies have 
been successful. 
A more detailed example can be seen in the case of the IT sector. This is of 
particular importance in the Irish case, as software firms have been regularly 
cited by commentators within and beyond Ireland as one of the most successful 
examples of FDI spillovers (Andreosso-O‟Callaghan and Lenihan, 2006).  
Buckley et al (2006) outline that the majority of foreign and domestic firms in the 
software industry in Ireland are located in the same region.  Citing the work of 
Crone (2002), they outline that in excess of 70% of MNE subsidiaries and 87% of 
domestic firms are located in and around the greater Dublin area.  They proceed 
to argue that such a concentration of indigenous and foreign software firms in 
one area is likely to facilitate increased technology transfer between the two sets 
of firms.  Barry (1999) argued that software is an industry where one-third of all 
indigenous software firms have been started by ex-employees of transnationals.  
In a similar vein, in the case of the software industry in Ireland, evidence 
indicates that the vast majority of indigenous firms were founded by former 
employees of software and hardware transnationals (Buckley, 2005; Buckley et 
al., 2006).   
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In explaining such „success‟, Buckley et al (2006) argue that a number of factors 
were likely to have contributed to maximising productivity spillovers to the 
indigenous software industry in Ireland.  These include: (1) the fact that 
transnationals choosing Ireland could be described as technologically superior 
(i.e. they employed high end technologies); (2) the transnational software sector 
in Ireland is almost entirely export focused; (3) former transnational employees 
who subsequently went on to establish their own new ventures were key 
knowledge transfer agents to indigenous software firms; (4) the indigenous 
software firms demonstrated a high absorptive capacity, e.g. via a high degree of 
tertiary educated employees; (5) the clustering of indigenous and transnational 
firms; and (6) the indigenous software sector was enhanced by Irish government 
policies which focused on a reorientation of the education system in the 1980s 
with the objective of providing a pool of graduates for technology focused 
industries.  Point 5 in this list, the development of industry clusters, highlights a 
related – and to a degree a necessary precursor - to the maximization of FDI 
spillovers and linkages. Indeed, one of the key reasons for the promotion of 
cluster policy is so that firms located in particular clusters will engage in linkages 
and spillovers with each other.  
 
Exactly how successful was the creation of clusters in Ireland?  A focus on 
creating sectoral and spatial clusters in Ireland really only began in earnest in the 
1980s (Buckley and Ruane, 2006). Such efforts were focused around two key 
high technology sectors, namely, electronics and chemicals/pharmaceuticals.  
More specifically, four segments of the electronics sector were targeted: 
microprocessors, software, computer products and printers.  In line with this 
strategy, some of the key players in these sectors, namely Intel and Microsoft, 
were attracted to establish operations in Ireland (ibid.).  With the location of such 
firms, and subsequently Hewlett Packard in printing, Ireland to all purposes had 
an “electronics hub” and the “spokes” were soon populated by dozens of smaller 
enterprises (ibid. 1620).  Ireland could thus be said to have been a significant 
beneficiary of the formation of clusters (Krugman, 1997); with the presence of the 
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above-named firms contributing to the average share of US FDI in electronics to 
Ireland increasing to 27 per cent between 1994 and 2001, compared to a rate of 
less than 12 per cent for Irish manufacturing as a whole (Buckley and Ruane, 
2006). Two other key sectors where industrial clusters were created include  
chemicals and pharmaceuticals, with such firms clustering primarily in the Cork 
region of Ireland.  However, in contrast to experience in the electronics sector, 
where production linkages between firms developed, this was not the case with 
the chemicals and pharmaceuticals clusters.   
 
In general, the empirical evidence on the impact of clusters in Ireland is, 
however, limited, with what evidence there is suggesting that there has been 
relatively little sectoral clustering between transnationals and local firms, at least 
in low-tech sectors and manufacturing overall (Gleeson et al, 2005; Buckley and 
Ruane, 2006). As seen from the above discussion, there does however, appear 
to have been some clustering between transnationals and local firms in some 
high-tech sectors. As such, in concluding this brief discussion of the success or 
otherwise of cluster policy in Ireland (as part of our look at industrial policy more 
broadly), it seems that the prevailing evidence is mixed and inconclusive. The 
Irish government (Report of the Small Business Forum, 2006) has recognised, 
however, that as more low-value-added activities migrate to lower-cost countries, 
a greater proportion of GNP will have to be produced by indigenous firms 
(predominantly SMEs). Other reports commissioned by the Irish government 
(such as Goodbody Economic Consultants, 2002) have also focused on the 
importance of entrepreneurship and more specifically on eliminating the barriers 
to entrepreneurship in Ireland.  Whilst welcoming this focus, we would argue that 
this should have come much earlier in Ireland‟s development, and we see this as 
an important „lesson‟ for other states as they look for lessons to be learned in 
terms of industrial policy trajectory.  
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This review only serves to reiterate our point that a holistic industrial policy needs 
to account for the limitations and fragilities of FDI-led growth and hence also 
promote measures to grow domestic capacity, and to deliver a variety of growth 
„drivers‟ for the economy.  It is fair to say that the limitations of FDI-led growth 
have been increasingly (if belatedly) recognised, and Ireland is now recognised 
to be vulnerable due to the downturn in the US economy, given its overwhelming 
reliance on US-based FDI. As such, at this critical period, Ireland faces 
increasing competition for FDI from emerging economies, and Ireland is no 
longer a cheap country in which to do business, due to rises in wages and raw 
material costs13. Whilst this has been realised, a more holistic approach to policy 
development at the outset could have avoided some of the problems we 
identified above, thereby enhancing economic development, a point which small, 
peripheral economies elsewhere may wish to note. 
 
The discussion here will be incomplete without reference to the role of large 
indigenous firms in the development process.  In many countries, such firms 
which are large by developing countries standards but rather „puny‟ in 
international terms are the spearheads of spreading technical change and 
productivity growth.  Amsden (1989) is the leading exponent of the critical role of 
large indigenous firms in late industrialization.  What is, therefore, required in 
industrial policy for developing countries is the right balance between the 
promotion of large and small firms.  To illustrate this point, Indian industrial policy 
in the period 1950 to 1980 is an example of a policy which encouraged small 
firms at the expense of large firms in order primarily to safeguard employment.  
Despite its good economic rationale, this policy is generally regarded as being a 
failure as it stopped the growth of large firms and thwarted their role in the 
development process. A balance or „econo-diversity‟ is thus required.  See 
further Little (1994), Ahluwalia (1992) and Singh (forthcoming).  
                                       
13
 A related point is made by Gottheil (2003) when he argues that FDI is highly mobile and that in the case 
of Ireland there is also the additional threat that other countries (e.g. some of the New Member States) may 
also introduce low corporate taxes.  He proceeds to argue that from the perspective of a potential investor 
that “It’s the best corporate tax deal that matters” (p. 734).   
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8. Policy Evaluation 
In view of the types of market failures that are likely to arise in the SME sector 
noted above (e.g. the finance gap), one possible route to help improve the 
efficiency of such markets is through the services provided by industrial 
development agencies. The extent to which development agencies in Ireland 
have produced the expected effects is an issue of significant and ongoing 
debate. One key issue that emerged in discussions (particularly pertaining to the 
1990s) is that of agency duplication of services provided.
 
The Industrial 
Evaluation Unit (1999) found that around 40% of firms that received support from 
more than one agency availed of such support within the same time period. The 
prime lesson to be learned in this regard is that the support environment provided 
by government to firms needs to be clearly targeted and focused in its delivery. A 
clear underlying rationale for a specific type of intervention needs to be provided 
in all cases. 
 
One of the outcomes of EU funding in the case of Ireland is that over time there 
was increased pressure to engage in an evaluation of industrial policies (primarily 
to begin with for reasons of accountability). Indeed, guidelines from the European 
Commission (EC) as a result of Ireland being a Structural Fund beneficiary were 
definitely a key driving force behind the much greater emphasis placed on 
evaluation in Irish policy from the early 1990s onwards (see Andreosso O‟ 
Callaghan and Lenihan, 2006). The same issues are also pertinent to small 
African states. A number of possible strategies can be adopted in the context of 
industrial policy evaluation (options 1-3 are not mutually exclusive and it needs to 
be stressed that a mixed approach is both possible and even desirable):  
 
1. Wait until pressure comes from outside to evaluate. In Ireland‟s case this was 
from the EU.  In the case of the African economies, the impetus may come from 
agencies providing ODA. This was the stance largely adopted by Ireland from 
around 1993 onwards.  Boyle (2005) writing in the context of evaluation capacity 
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development in Ireland more generally, argues a similar point when he suggests 
that from the perspective of developing countries that Ireland provides a key 
lesson in terms of monitoring and evaluation (M&E).  More specifically, he 
outlines that “strong external pressures linked to the availability of significant 
resources can be a catalyst in initiating an MNE system” (p. i).  He argues that an 
analogy in the case of poor countries is the requirement to work on „Poverty 
Reduction Strategies‟ with related M&E systems, in the context of debt relief as 
part of the „Highly indebted Poor Country Initiative‟.    
2. Familiarise themselves with „best practice‟ or at least „good practice‟ evaluation 
frameworks and methodologies adopted internationally
 
(reflecting on the key 
issues learned) so that they are in a position to know „how‟ to evaluate when 
requested to do so by external donors or organisations ; 
3. View evaluation as a beneficial tool for learning. This would involve adopting a 
proactive approach whereby evaluation would take place at the three stages of 
the industrial policy process: policy formulation (ex–ante evaluation focusing on 
the market failure argument as a rationale for intervention and fundamental 
economic principles such as opportunity cost); policy implementation; and policy 
accountability (ex–post evaluation) (Rist 1995). Such an approach not recognises 
evaluation as something necessary given external pressures, but more positively 
sees evaluation as a worthwhile activity in terms of lessons to be learned that 
can subsequently be incorporated into future policy interventions.  There is no 
doubt that many would regard evaluation as a „luxury‟ in African economies 
where resources are already scarce.  We would argue however, that if robust 
evaluations are carried out (which ask the right questions relating to issues such 
as deadweight, displacement14, multipliers and linkages) this may lead to 
improved future industrial policy interventions which in the long run could prove 
to be extremely cost effective and efficient.    
 
We do not claim to hold Ireland up a role model in the context of  industrial policy 
                                       
14
 For a discussion of the concepts and estimation of deadweight and displacement, in the 
context of Ireland, see Lenihan (1999 and 2004) and Lenihan and Hart (2004). 
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evaluation. Indeed, it hovered around option 1 for most of the 1990s, although of 
late, it is certainly getting nearer to option 3. This is highlighted by Lenihan et al 
(2005; 14), who argue that “the methodological rigor of Irish industrial policy 
evaluations has been improving in recent years”.   It was not until some pressure 
came from the European Commission that Irish policy makers and academics 
began take industrial policy evaluation seriously. This is somewhat difficult to 
comprehend given that an interventionist approach to industrial policy has been a 
feature of the industrial policy stance by successive governments in Ireland since 
the 1950s, with the first grant to firms actually being awarded as far back as 
1952. The degree of subsidy intervention in the Irish case is aptly summed up by 
Lenihan et al (2005) when they show that over the period 1980-2003, in the 
region of €5.5 billion was provided by the four Irish development agencies in the 
form of grant payments and equity investments.  The key point is that any policy 
intervention should bring about a level of „additionality‟ in excess of what would 
have happened if no such intervention had taken place (i.e. explore the counter–
factual, which involves trying to assess what would most likely have happened if 
no intervention had taken place).  In this regard, Storey (2000) argues that a 
prerequisite to any evaluation is that clear objectives be specified. More 
precisely, he highlights the “…impossibility of conducting an evaluation in the 
absence of clearly specified objectives for the policy concerned” (p. 177).  This 
calls for a clearly defined set of policy objectives from the outset, and to allow for 
„trail and error‟ as an important part of policy development. As UNCTAD (2007; 
87) notes, referring in particular to East Asian experience: 
“Indeed, the intrinsic differences among the Asian experiences underscore the 
importance of “trial and error” as an important ingredient of policy formulation and 
implementation in developmental States.  This process should benefit from 
constant monitoring and the feeding of the lessons learnt from monitoring into 
new policies to overcome earlier shortcomings”.  
An additional challenge (as with all calls for evaluation) is who should actually 
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carry out such evaluations. The follow-on question is who should evaluate the 
evaluators?  Clearly, in the face of the level of corruption and lack of resources to 
carry out some evaluations in some of the African economies, this issue is 
particularly pertinent.   
 
9.   Bringing in East Asian Experience 
Given some of the failures (as well as successes) of „traditional‟ Japanese 
industrial policy (see Bailey and Sugden, 2007), some may conclude that Katz 
(1998) is correct in arguing that „development state‟ policies should be avoided.  
However, in a sense economies are always in a state of „development‟; for us, 
the key is to adapt and tailor policies holistically to that stage of development.  
However, before considering the relevance of the East Asian developmental 
State to African countries, we need to ask: is there actually an East Asian model 
as such?  Mainstream contributions sometimes deny the existence of such a 
model and argue that even if it existed, it was not very successful.  Yet real-world 
business people have no hesitation in identifying an “Asian way of doing 
business” (Greenspan, 1998). In this vein, Singh (1999) suggested that there is 
actually general agreement on the following characteristics of the East Asian 
„model‟: 
1. A close relationship between the government and business where the 
government did not act without consulting business and vice versa. 
2. Many interventions were carried out through a system of „administrative 
guidance‟ rather than through formal legislation. 
3. The relationship between the corporation and the financial system in 
countries like Japan and Korea was also very different from that of Anglo-
Saxon capitalism. The former countries followed the so-called main bank 
system which involved long-term relationships between the corporations 
and the main banks. This enabled Japanese or Korean managers to take 
a long-term view in their investment decisions. The managers were not 
constrained by the threat of hostile take-overs on stock markets as in the 
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case in the Anglo-Saxon countries, and takeover attempts were often 
seen as an unwelcome intrusion on the „family way‟ of doing things. 
4. There were differences in the internal organisation of East Asian 
corporations compared with those of the US and the UK. The former 
involved co-operative relationships between management and labour, 
epitomised by the system of lifetime employment. This implied 
considerable „imperfections‟ in the labour market. 
5. As for competition in product markets, such competition was not regarded 
by the East Asian authorities as an unalloyed good. Unlike in countries like 
the US, economic philosophy in the east Asian countries did not accept 
the dictum that “the more competition the better‟. The government in these 
countries were of the view that, from the perspective of promoting 
investment and technical change, the optimal degree of competition was 
not perfect or maximum competition. The governments had therefore 
purposefully managed and guided competition: it had been encouraged 
but also restricted in a number of ways. 
6. East Asian governments sought not „close‟ but what might be called 
„strategic‟ integration with the world economy, i.e. they integrated up to the 
point where they felt it was useful for them to do so. Thus during their 
high-growth development phase, Japan (between 1950 and 1973) and 
Korea (1970s and 1980s) integrated with the world economy in relation to 
exports but not imports; with respect to science and technology but not 
finance and multi-national investment (see Chakravarty and Singh (1988).   
 
Of course, these points represent a characterisation of the East Asian model as 
an „ideal‟ type. Not all countries, or even Japan and Korea, have followed the 
model exactly at all times in the post-war period. As far as government-business 
relationships are concerned in reality there has been a continuum with the 
closest relationship to be found in Korea, and the least close in Thailand. 
Malaysia and Indonesia fall in between. Similarly, the main bank system worked 
differently in Korea compared with Japan. Unlike Japan, where the „main banks‟ 
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were by and large private entities, in Korea for much of the period these were 
directly state-controlled. Only in the recent period have they been privatised. 
There were also differences in approaches towards FDI and how this was used 
for development. Nevertheless, there is considerable truth in the view that the 
Asian way of doing business and the institutional structures it has generated are 
rather different from those of countries like the US and the UK (Greenspan, 1998; 
Summers, 1998). 
 
In terms of applying this model to African countries, UNCTAD (2007B) does not 
see a simple replication as being very useful.  However, it is nevertheless the 
case that East Asian countries, with the exception of Hong Kong, have at 
different times used a wide range of industrial policy measures with considerable 
success. Pulling together this variety of experiences, Chang (2006) and Lall 
(2006) both argue that there is indeed a strong case for the use of industrial 
policy but that the success of such policy critically depends on how it is designed 
and implemented. Drawing on their work we can highlight the following main 
points from East Asian experience: 
 
1. Selectivity is important. This selection of target industries need to be realistic 
and related both to the country‟s technological capabilities and world market 
conditions. The success of East Asian countries “owe a lot to the fact that they 
did not attempt to make too big a step” (Chang, 2006; 126). Over time, 
technological deepening can be directly related to selective interventions (Lall, 
2006). 
 
2. Industrial policy needs to be closely integrated with an export strategy, 
especially in small economies.  In addition, scale economies cannot be achieved 
without entering the export market early on. This in turn brings us back to the 
relevance of the Single Market for Ireland in providing a wider market. Lall (2006) 
argues convincingly that the success of export orientation in East Asia did not lie 
in „getting prices right‟ and realising static comparative advantage as in the 
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mainstream story, but rather enabling successful selective intervention to build 
new forms of dynamic comparative advantage which otherwise would not have 
happened, or may have taken much longer to emerge.   
 
3. Linked to this, Lall (2006) suggests that export orientation imposed a strict 
discipline on industry and government in Korea and Taiwan; in Singapore this 
came through the need to attract, retain and upgrade FDI. More generally, the 
government needs to find ways to discipline the recipients of the rents it creates 
through the use of tariffs, subsidies etc, in order to compensate for the loss of 
market discipline. 
 
4. The implementing bureaucracy needs to be both competent and politically 
insulated. Chang stresses that East Asian bureaucracies improved through 
continuous efforts over time, and not because of some unique initial endowment.  
 
5. Close interaction between the government and private sector is necessary 
without the former becoming hostage to the latter.  On this, Chang refers to 
Evans‟ (1995) use of the term „embedded autonomy‟ to reflect the needs for both 
roots in society but also its own will and power. In this vein, Bailey and Sugden 
(2006) suggest that where Japanese industrial policy started to „go wrong‟ was 
when it was effectively captured by giant firms for their own benefit. Recognising 
and avoiding such dangers seems crucial to enable policy to function for a public 
rather than a private benefit.   
 
6.  FDI played different roles in technology development in the East Asian „tigers‟. 
Those countries favouring domestic firms restricted incoming FDI, whereas those 
which targeted FDI sought to guide it and encourage upgrading over time. On 
this, Lall (2006) argues that in the longer run the only way to promote successful 
industrial development is through developing and diversifying local capabilities, 
and that whilst TNCs can assist in this they will do so only up to the point where it 
is profitable for them. More broadly, it is up to the government to provide the 
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quasi-public goods needed for domestic capability development, upgrading and 
collective learning.  Selectivity in FDI (as in Ireland) seems critical in making the 
most of FDI for broader development, both in building local capabilities and in 
tapping into high-tech value chains (Lall, 2006). 
 
Conclusions 
There are some noteworthy similarities and lessons to be learned (positive and 
negative) by the smaller African economies from both Irish and East Asian 
industrial policy experiences.  Key amongst these is the concern expressed in 
this paper that industrial policy should not be seen purely in narrow terms, that is 
with a sole focus on attracting FDI.  We argue here that there is need for a more 
„holistic‟ approach to economic development which inter-alia focuses on the 
development of domestic entrepreneurship and indigenous firm expansion more 
generally as well as emphasising the importance of other supply side factors 
(e.g. infrastructure; well functioning labour markets). This more all-encompassing 
view of industrial policy and economic development may, it could be argued, take 
a longer time to materialise. This is a difficult position for the African economies 
to be faced with given the extremely high levels of poverty and deprivation 
witnessed in many of these small African economies. Such a „holistic‟ growth 
trajectory could, however, lead to a more sustainable industrial development 
path, in contrast to the current situation in Ireland whereby the recent down turn 
in the US economy has sent shock waves through the Irish economy given its 
(over)dependence on US firms.15  
 
This paper has provided some novel insights by providing a comparison between 
Ireland, East Asia and the small African economies.  When comparisons in terms 
of industrial policy lessons to be learned have taken place, it tends to be solely 
vis-a-vis the East Asian experience (which, as seen above, undoubtedly also 
provides interesting economic development insights but with certain caveats). 
                                       
15
 Even as far back as 1989, there were 307 US companies located in Ireland.  By 2001, the 
number of US companies reached a peak at 531 (source: UNCTAD WID (2005) Country Profile 
Ireland and various Annual Report from IDA Ireland (various years).   
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We suggest that another important contribution can come by looking at the Irish 
example, given its emphasis on corporatism rather than simply relying on state 
direction in the operation of industrial policy.  The Irish model has some benefits 
in that it can also be seen as more democratic and has protected workers‟ rights 
during the development process, in contrast to the dirigisite East Asia model 
(what Thornton and Thornton, 2008, refer to as „development without freedom‟).  
In relation to the small size of the African economies, the paper recommends 
regional integration and sufficient ODA for infrastructural development. 
 
Finally, we stress that some immediate actions are needed, notably with regard 
to the financial system in the African economies.  Without such changes, a poorly 
functioning financial system will continue to keep investment at low levels.16 It is 
also important to bear in mind that the various small African economies each 
face their own industrial and economic development challenges, and we do not 
suggest a „one size fits all‟ approach.  As outlined by UNCTAD (2007B), referring 
to East-Asian experience, the path to sustainable growth and development is 
derived from “a pragmatic mix of markets and state action, taking into account 
the country-specific development challenges” (UNCTAD, 2007B; 61). It suggests 
that the challenge for Africa is not how to copy any model, but how to create 
“capitalisms” that are adaptable to the unique opportunities and development 
challenges in each African country (UNCTAD, 2007B).  In this sense, useful 
lessons from elsewhere can be seen, but wholesale emulation of other models is 
inappropriate. As Coates (2007; 193) concludes (when referring to Japanese 
experience): 
“What works in one period is unlikely to work in the next; and even when it 
„works‟, its distribution of costs and benefits is never socially equal. So 
when deciding which tiger to ride, it is worth remembering that the choice 
is only between tigers, and that if a safe ride is what you want, you would 
do well not to ride tigers at all”. 
 
 
                                       
16
On the development of stock markets and banks in Africa, see further Singh (1999) and Singh 
(forthcoming) 
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